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This dissertation consists of five essays contributing to a better understanding of
three fundamental lines of research in behavioral economics: trust and cooperation
in social interactions (essays in Appendix A.1–A.3), gender discrimination (essay in
Appendix A.4), and decision making under risk and uncertainty (essay in Appendix
A.5). All essays are novel contributions and based on the experimental economics
method. In some of the essays, game-theoretical solutions are provided and experi-
mental findings are related to behavioral theories.
Trust and cooperation in social interactions
In section 2.1, I summarize an essay on the behavior of trustors and trustees in
the framework of an investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995) where
the trustee’s action space is extended by the opportunity to take money from the
trustor, in addition to the amount received. This makes trustors more vulnerable
toward trustees in that trustees can do additional harm to trustors beyond not re-
turning any money. This important aspect has not been featured in the investment
game to date, but is of great relevance in practice. Imagine, for example, a firm
sharing its confidential employee data with a services company; those data could
be sold to a third party. Will trustors place trust in a framework where doing so
provides the trustee with the opportunity to misuse, in addition to not reciprocate,
trust? If so, will trustees make use of this opportunity?
In section 2.2, I summarize an essay on the cooperative behavior of issuers and credit
rating agencies (CRAs) in a simplified rating-market setup where regulatory reforms
are strictly implemented. The reforms concern the prevalent issuer-pays compensa-
tion model of CRAs, which allows issuers and CRAs to collude on an outcome where
CRAs offer overly optimistic ratings and issuers choose the most favorable among
the solicited ratings (e.g., White, 2010; Jiang, Stanford, and Xie, 2012; Skreta and
Veldkamp, 2009; Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2012). Numerous reforms have been
suggested in both theory and practice. We develop a simple game-theoretical model
that captures the main aspects of the repeated interaction between an issuer and a
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CRA under those reforms that theoretically seem promising. We then study how
issuers and CRAs behave in a controlled laboratory environment, allowing a maxi-
mum of control of extraneous variables that might promote cooperative behavior in
both theory and practice. Will issuers and CRAs be able to establish cooperation
even in such a strictly regulated compensation context?
In section 2.3, I summarize an essay on the strategic interaction of consumers
and sellers in a Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) framework (Schmidt, Spann, and
Zeithammer, 2015). In such a framework of participative pricing (Kim, Natter, and
Spann, 2009), consumers are allowed to freely choose the price they are willing to pay
for a seller’s product, including zero. Cooperation between consumers and PWYW
sellers arises when consumers pay prices that are sufficiently high and sellers decide to
offer their products under the PWYW pricing mechanism rather than conventional
price setting (e.g., Schmidt, Spann, and Zeithammer, 2015). In many practical
applications of PWYW pricing, consumers choose which price to pay not in iso-
lation, but in the presence of other consumers. As an illustration, imagine a the-
ater visitor who is standing at the counter and surrounded by other visitors while
making the payment decision. In such an environment, cooperation between con-
sumers and PWYW sellers might be more pronounced as voluntary payments are
largely based on consumers’ fairness concerns (e.g., Kim, Natter, and Spann, 2009)
and fairness concerns become stronger while being observed, which can be
rationalized by image concerns (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2008; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). In our experiment, we
exogenously vary the environment in which consumers make voluntary payments
to PWYW sellers in order to find out in which environment voluntary payments
are maximized. In particular, are consumers’ payments to a PWYW seller higher
depending on whom they are surrounded with (e.g., Schlüter and Vollan, 2015), by
whether or not their payments are observable (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2012), or a com-
bination of both?
Gender discrimination
In section 2.4, I summarize an essay on gender discrimination in the context of
university teaching evaluations. In this context, it has been shown empirically that
male raters discriminate against female instructors in that they assign systematically
higher performance ratings to male as compared to female instructors (e.g., Boring,
2017; Mengel, Sauermann, and Zölitz, 2019). The evaluation differences observed
in these studies can neither be explained by a selection bias (e.g., Heckman, 2010)
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of raters nor by differences in the actual teaching performance of instructors. Yet,
it is difficult to identify a bias as the cause of the evaluation differences. Other
factors might explain the evaluation differences, which are difficult to exclude when
studied outside a controlled environment. We thus employ a laboratory experiment
that enables us to hold constant any factors that potentially enter and distort the
evaluation process of raters. This allows us to identify a bias as the cause of the
observed differences in evaluations, if any. Do performance ratings toward female
and male instructors become gender-unbiased in the most reduced context without
any personal interaction with instructors and potential other factors distorting the
evaluations of raters?
Decision making under risk and uncertainty
In section 2.5, I summarize an essay on individual as well as social decision
making under temporally delayed risks. In experimental economics, there is se-
lective evidence on temporal delay effects in the domains of individual decision
making under risk (e.g., Abdellaoui, Diecidue, and Öncüler, 2011; Pan, Web, and
Zank, 2019) as well as social decision making under risk, i.e., trust (e.g., Neo et al.,
2013; Ederer and Schneider, forthcoming). In both domains the studies differ in
various methodological aspects and so do not allow for a unifying analysis of deci-
sion making under temporally delayed risks, respectively. In addition, the preceding
evidence of temporal delay effects on individual decisions under risk is incomplete in
that previous evidence has focused on individual known risk, i.e., situations where
the probability distribution underlying a risky lottery is known. However, most
scenarios in reality are characterized by individual unknown (ambiguous) risk, i.e.,
situations where the probability distribution underlying a risky lottery is unknown
to the decision maker (Ellsberg, 1961; Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015). In order
to get a comprehensive understanding of the impact of temporal distance in decisions
under individual risk, both known and unknown, as well decisions under social risk,
we use the psychological framework of construal level theory (CLT; Liberman and
Trope, 1998; Trope and Liberman, 2000, 2003, 2010). To what extent is CLT able to
unify and describe the observed behavioral patterns of individual and social decision
making under temporally delayed risks?
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2 Summary of Essays
2.1 Trust, Vulnerability and Trustworthiness
(coauthored with Claudia Keser)
published in
Economics Letters
Motivation: In the experimental paradigm of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995),
we extent the trustee’s action space by the opportunity to take money from the
trustor, in addition to the amount received. This makes trustors more vulnerable
toward trustees in that trustees can do additional harm to trustors beyond not re-
turning any money. Using the concept of backward induction leads to the same
subgame perfect equilibrium solution (Selten, 1965) in the setting with the extended
action space and the original investment game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe
(1995). Nevertheless, it is likely that the behavior of trustors and trustees differs
in the two settings. In particular, behavior is based on expectations and different
action spaces invoke different expectations, as is demonstrated in related contexts of
dictator games (e.g., List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008). In these contexts, dictator play-
ers give significantly less amounts of money to recipients when their action space of
giving or keeping money is extended by the option to take money from the recipi-
ents’ endowments. A main reason for this finding is that dictator players form their
expectations about what is appropriate to give based on their available actions (List,
2007; Bardsley, 2008). For example, choosing to give nothing in a setting, where the
alternatives are to give or to take money from the recipient, might be considered as
being fair, since no money is taken from the recipient. However, choosing to give
nothing, when the only other choice is to give money to the recipient, might not be
considered as being fair, since it is the worst option for the recipient.
7
We put this line of argumentation into a context where social interaction is involved.
Specifically, we study if the same line of argumentation applies in the context of
an investment game, where the trustee’s decision is technically similar to the de-
cision in a dictator game, but preceded by the decision of a trustor. This might
have two important implications for the behavior of trustees, allowing us to shed
light on the role of expectations in a more realistic environment. First, trustors
who expect trustees to weigh the fairness of their actions based on their available
actions might invest less in the game with the larger action space, because in keeping
with the line of argumentation above, they shall expect lower amounts returned from
trustees. The lower investments by trustors might then indeed lead to lower amounts
returned by trustees. Second, trustors might expect trustees who have been given
a positive amount to attribute intentional kindness to their decisions. Intentional
kindness is a key determinant of positively reciprocal behavior and can be inferred
from which choice has been made taking into account the available alternatives (e.g.,
Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2008).
In our context, investing positive amounts despite being highly vulnerable toward
trustees might be interpreted as being intentionally kind. Hence, trustors who in-
vest positive amounts and expect trustees to attribute intentional kindness to their
actions might then decide to not invest less in the game with the larger action space,
because they shall expect positively reciprocal behavior from trustees. This in turn
might increase the amounts returned by trustees. In a controlled environment, we
try to explain trustors’ and trustees’ behavior in the investment with the larger ac-
tion space by drawing on the two considerations just made.
Methods : We design and implement a between-subjects design with subjects being
randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: BASE and TAKE. In
BASE, subjects take part in an investment game that is similar to the experimen-
tal paradigm by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Both trustors and trustees
receive an initial endowment of 12 Euros, half of which may be used by trustors to
invest. Any amount invested by trustors is quadrupled so that trustees receive the
quadrupled amount invested by trustors. Trustees may keep the amount received,
or return part or all of it to the trustors. Payoffs are such that the trustor receives
the initial endowment minus the amount invested plus the amount returned, and the
trustee receives the initial endowment plus the quadrupled amount invested minus
the amount returned. TAKE is identical to BASE in every respect, except for one
feature: in addition to the quadrupled amount received, trustees may take some
positive amount from the trustors’ remaining endowments, at most, however, up to
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the amount invested. This alters the trustee’s payoff function as follows: instead of
subtracting the amount returned from the trustee’s payoff, positive amounts taken,
if any, might be added. In both experimental conditions, we ask trustors to state
the amount of money they expect to be returned or taken away by trustees as well
as the amounts they would consider as fair.
Main findings : Our main findings indicate that trustors invest significantly lower
amounts in TAKE as compared to BASE, which can neither be explained by trustors’
expectations nor by their fairness considerations in our experiment. The amounts re-
turned by trustees in terms of a relative-payback measure remain largely unaffected
by the trustors’ decisions, although trustees, when given the opportunity, refrain
from taking away even a single incidence from trustors. We may interpret this result
as intention-based reciprocity, as investing positive amounts despite a very high risk
of being exploited can serve the trustee as a strong signal of the trustor’s intention
to enter a reciprocal-trust relationship (McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith, 2003).
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2.2 An Experimental Investigation of
Rating-Market Regulation
(coauthored with Claudia Keser, Emmanuel Peterlé,
and Martin Schmidt)
published in
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Motivation: We study in a controlled environment the effectiveness of a regula-
tory reform intended to prevent cooperation between issuers and credit rating agen-
cies (CRAs) under the prevalent issuer-pays compensation model of CRAs. The
issuer-pays model allows issuers of financial instruments to observe the credit ratings,
which CRAs assign to their products, before deciding whether or not to purchase the
ratings and thus make them public to potential investors (e.g., Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 2008). CRAs receive over 90 percent of their income from issuer
fees (e.g., Darcy, 2009), which makes them highly dependent on those fees and hence,
puts into question their autonomy in the provision of accurate ratings. Evidence from
financial economics shows that the issuer-pays model makes CRAs to inflate ratings,
i.e., offer overly optimistic ratings in order to attract business (e.g., White, 2010;
Jiang, Stanford, and Xie, 2012), and issuers to shop for ratings, i.e., solicit multiple
ratings from different CRAs and choose the most favorable one (e.g., Skreta and
Veldkamp, 2009; Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2012).
In order to increase the overall quality, i.e., accuracy of ratings, numerous regula-
tory reforms have been suggested. In 2008, Andrew Cuomo, then Attorney General
and today’s governor of New York, reached a three-year agreement with today’s
most famous CRAs, which required issuers of structured finance products to pay the
issuer fee up front, i.e., before a CRA conducts its initial analysis (New York State
Office of the Attorney General, 2008). This reform was intended to make CRAs less
dependent on the question of receiving the issuer fee or not and thus to increase
their autonomy in providing accurate credit ratings. Even though the success of this
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reform was empirically not evaluated, it is doomed to fail from a theoretical point of
view. Issuers might consider up-front payments as sunk costs and thus be willing to
pay, ex post, for an agreement with the CRA not to publish a bad rating (Bolton,
Freixas, and Shapiro, 2012). A much better solution could be a reform that prohibits
rating shopping by enforcing CRAs to automatically disclose any rating requested
and paid for by an issuer (Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2012).
While this seems promising in theory, we might expect the real behavior of issuers
and CRAs to differ, in particular when interaction is repeated and rating markets
are highly concentrated: issuers and CRAs are likely to have an interest in a long-
term cooperation where issuers are interested in good ratings, which CRAs might be
willing to supply since they are interested in future rating requests (e.g., Ashcraft,
Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery, 2010; Griffin and Tang, 2021; Frenkel, 2015). If
this cooperative interest is strong enough, the suggested reforms are unlikely to pre-
vent CRAs from inflating ratings, even when rating shopping is impossible and rating
disclosure is enforced. We shed light on this controversy by conducting an experi-
ment in a controlled laboratory environment.
Methods : We introduce a simple game-theoretical model that captures the main
aspects of the repeated interaction between an issuer and a monopolistic CRA un-
der strict regulatory reforms. The reforms concern the issuer-pays compensation
model of CRAs and include no communication and no possibilities for hidden agree-
ments, up-front payments of rating-fees (as suggested and implemented by Andrew
Cuomo), direct publication of any rating that has been requested (as suggested
by Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2012), and in addition, financial penalties for in-
accurate ratings. In a between-subjects design, we vary the level of the financial
penalty (low vs. high) that the CRA incurs by providing inaccurate ratings. In each
repetition of the finite game, an issuer may request a rating of its financial product
from a monopolistic CRA. If a rating is being requested, the CRA privately observes
the true quality of the issuer’s product and decides whether to provide and publish
either an accurate or an inaccurate rating. CRAs obtain the full issuer fee if they
provide accurate ratings, and are penalized for providing inaccurate ratings. For
each rating that is inaccurate, a CRA is deducted 10 percent of its income in the
low penalty condition and 50 percent of its income in the high penalty condition.
The game is parametrized such that the subgame perfect equilibrium is for the CRA
to always report accurately and knowing this, for the issuer to never request a rating.
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Main findings : We observe that, against the subgame-perfect solution of the rating-
market game, issuers request ratings in about 75% of the cases. CRAs cooperate and
provide overly optimistic ratings in more than 50% of the cases, independent of the
level of the financial penalty for inaccurate ratings. Moreover, regression results in-
dicate that providing an overly optimistic rating significantly increases the likelihood
of another cooperative outcome with the issuer, while providing an overly pessimistic
rating significantly decreases the likelihood of another cooperative outcome with the
issuer. Our findings can be explained by the chain store paradox of Selten (1978),
where both players pursuing a “deterrence strategy” (in our case not requesting a
rating and not providing an overly optimistic rating) in some periods of the finitely
repeated game might help to establish a mutually beneficial outcome in the long run.
Cooperation between issuers and CRAs is therefore to be expected also in reality,
where the cooperative interests of issuers and CRAs might be promoted by many
other factors.
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2.3 Who is Watching me?
Disentangling Audience and Interpersonal
Closeness Effects in a Pay-What-You-Want
Context
(coauthored with Elisa Hofmann,
Michael E. Fiagbenu, Amir M. Tahamtan,
and Tobias Regner)
published in
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Motivation: We study if consumers in a Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) context
make higher voluntary payments when their payments are observable by close oth-
ers. In a PWYW context, buyers can freely choose the price to pay for a seller’s
product. Hence, the seller’s income is largely determined by the fairness preferences
of its buyers (e.g., Kim, Natter, and Spann, 2009). It is well acknowledged in eco-
nomic research that being observed by an audience increases buyers’ concerns for
fairness, which can be rationalized by image concerns (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole,
2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). Related
studies suggest that the more relevant (socially close) the observing audience is,
the stronger the image concerns and consequently, the higher the voluntary pay-
ments being made. Most of these studies, however, vary at the same time the
observability of payments and the social closeness of the observing audience, which
leaves the question open which of the two factors is actually responsible for the in-
crease in buyers’ payments. For example, it might be sufficient to be surrounded
without being observed by a close audience to increase payments. We, therefore,
design and implement an experiment tailored to disentangle the causal effects of
the observability of payments and the social closeness of the observing audience on
voluntary payments.
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Methods : We use the experimental paradigm by Schmidt, Spann, and Zeithammer
(2015) and let buyers in groups of three repeatedly make voluntary payments to a
PWYW seller. Each buyer makes individual payment decisions knowing that she or
he is connected with two other buyers, who define the surrounding audience. In our
2x2 between-subjects design, we vary the observability of payments and the inter-
personal closeness of the surrounding audience. Payments are observable means that
a buyer’s payment decision is publicly known to the other group members. Interper-
sonal closeness is induced by using a method from social psychology, where buyers
in a group are asked to stand up and look into each other’s eyes before the start of
the experiment.
Main findings : We compare buyers’ average payments in the four treatments and
find that being surrounded by close others as well as payments being observable by
close others increases voluntary payments. While both effects are positive and addi-
tive in total, they do not reinforce each other. That is, we do not find any interaction
effect. This finding leaves open an important question on the importance of image
concerns in close audiences. In particular, image concerns might become stronger
with the social closeness of the observing audience only up to a certain threshold.
When the observing audience becomes socially too close such as in the case of friends
or family, image concerns might become less important to the decision maker since
her or his generosity might be well-acknowledged in these audiences already.
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2.4 Gender Bias in the Evaluation of
Teaching Materials
(coauthored with Holger A. Rau,
Stefan T. Trautmann, and Christian König-Kersting)
published in
Frontiers in Psychology
Motivation: We provide clean and robust evidence for gender biases in the evalua-
tion of university teaching materials. Recent empirical evidence in economics suggest
gender biases in evaluation processes in academia, often driven by male evaluators in
favor of male instructors (e.g., Boring, 2017; Mengel, Sauermann, and Zölitz, 2019).
Even though these studies do not investigate gender differences in evaluations in a
controlled environment, they can exclude justifying explanations such as differences
in the teaching performance of female and male instructors. In particular, they
achieve this by demonstrating that the observed differences in evaluations do not
correlate with any teaching effectiveness measures. However, the gender differences
observed in these studies might not necessarily point at a gender bias, which is much
more difficult to identify. Other explanatory factors might play a role, which are
difficult to exclude when not studied in a controlled environment. For example, sub-
jective in-class experiences of evaluators or subjective experiences with instructors
(e.g., MacNell, Driscoll, and Hunt, 2015) might play an important role. Alterna-
tively, there might be a fundamental gender bias unrelated to any factual class or
instructor experience. Our aim is to separate these two explanations and study in
a controlled environment if performance ratings toward female and male instructors
become gender-unbiased, if any subjective experiences of female and male evaluators
are being eliminated.
Methods : In a laboratory setting, we present subjects with two sets of lecture slides
from an economics course in academia. The two sets of slides are identical in content
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but differ in their layout. Between subjects, we vary the gender of the instructor by
randomly assigning either a female or a male first name to the title page of the two
slide sets. The surname is kept constant as the common German name “Müller.“
Subjects browse through the two sets of slides and evaluate them along several di-
mensions. Six items concern the general quality of the slides, and three further
items concern the comparison of the two layouts presented. The latter only serves
to provide the study background for subjects. We sum up the six quality-related
items to an index of the evaluators’ perceived quality of the teaching material, which
we then compare between the induced gender. In order to generalize our findings
from this study to a more heterogeneous subject pool (mainly non-economists, partly
non-academic background, and partly current students), we conduct another study
with shorter and less technical slides online on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk),
keeping every other detail constant between the two studies.
Main findings : In two studies, one with a German student sample and the other with
a more heterogeneous subject pool, we find substantial lower evaluations of female-
named instructors as measured by our quality index. In accordance with previous
studies, the lower evaluations are driven by male evaluators with past experiences
made in university classes. No gender biases are observed for evaluators without a
college degree, i.e., without past experiences made in university classes. While in
the student sample female evaluators seem rather gender-unbiased in their evalu-
ations, female evaluators in the more heterogeneous subject pool tend to evaluate
female-named instructors more favorably than male-named instructors, if they own
a college degree. Overall, our findings imply that subtle biases toward gender exist
even in the most reduced contexts without any personal interaction and potential
other factors distorting the raters’ evaluations. However, the gender bias we observe
is not uniform in that study experiences, in general, seem to play an important role
for the bias to emerge.
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2.5 Delayed Risks in Individual and
Social Decisions
(coauthored with Holger A. Rau and
Stefan T. Trautmann)
working paper
Motivation: We aim to get a comprehensive understanding of individual and social
behavior under temporally delayed risks using the psychological framework of con-
strual level theory (CLT; Liberman and Trope, 1998; Trope and Liberman, 2000,
2003, 2010). While preceding evidence on temporal delay effects in economics is
rather selective and differs in many methodological aspects, CLT allows us to per-
form a unifying analysis of individual and social decisions under risk in both the
near and the distant future. CLT proposes that individuals trade off an outcome’s
desirability with its feasibility, and weight the outcome desirability relatively lower
than the outcome feasibility in the near future and vice versa in the more distant
future. The underlying reason is that outcome desirability and outcome feasibility
are mentally represented on different construal levels (Liberman and Trope, 1998;
Sagristano, Trope, and Liberman, 2002; Trope and Liberman, 2003). In the context
of gambling decisions, it has been shown that the outcome desirability is associated
with the payoff of a risky gamble and the outcome feasibility is associated with the
probability of winning of a risky gamble (Sagristano, Trope, and Liberman, 2002).
CLT thus implies, in an economic sense, that individuals weigh the payoff of a risky
lottery relatively lower than its probability of winning in the near future and rela-
tively higher than its probability of winning in the more distant future.
In our experiment, we test the implications of CLT along three dimensions of risk:
individual known risk, individual unknown (ambiguous) risk, and social risk. In
the dimensions of individual known and individual ambiguous risks, subjects value
lotteries characterized by either a low probability of winning a high payoff (i.e.,
“low–feasibility–high–desirability lottery“) or a high probability of winning a low
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payoff (i.e., “high–feasibility–low–desirability lottery“). Whereas in the dimension of
individual known risk the underlying probability distribution of winning either a high
or a low payoff is known, it is unknown in the dimension of individual ambiguous risk
(Ellsberg, 1961; Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015). In both domains, we study the
implications of CLT by testing if individuals value low–feasibility–high–desirability
lotteries higher in the more distant future as compared to the near future, and if
individuals value high–feasibility–low–desirability lotteries higher in the near future
as compared to the more distant future. Our setting also allows us to study the
implications of CLT for the ambiguity attitudes of individuals (Fox and Tversky,
1995; Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015). For this purpose, we hold constant the
level of feasibility and desirability, respectively, and compare subjects’ valuations of
risky lotteries with their ambiguous counterparts. That is, we compare subjects’
valuations of risky low–feasibility–high–desirability lotteries with their valuations
of ambiguous low–feasibility–high–desirability lotteries, and subjects’ valuations of
risky high–feasibility–low–desirability lotteries with their valuations of ambiguous
high–feasibility–low–desirability lotteries.
We complement our analysis of individual delayed risks with the analysis of socially
delayed risks. That is, we analyze trustors’ decisions in an investment game (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995) when they are confronted with a delayed decision of
the trustee. In particular, we let trustors make investment decisions knowing that
trustees will make their decision either in the near or the distant future.
Methods : In a between-subjects design, we identify the causal effects of temporal
delay by varying the point in time when the risks involved in the individual and the
social context are resolved. The risks are resolved either immediately (Early condi-
tion) or two weeks later (Late condition). Except for the timing of the resolution of
risks, both experimental conditionals are exactly identical in every respect. Each of
the two conditions consists of two experimental sessions.
In the first experimental session, we first implement a lottery task in order to elicit
subjects’ valuation of individual risk. Specifically, we elicit in an incentive-compatible
way subjects’ willingness to pay (WTP) for two risky and two ambiguous lotteries
presented to subjects as a pair, each. Each pair of lotteries consists of a lottery that
is characterized by a high feasibility and a low desirability, and another one that is
characterized by a low feasibility and a high desirability. To ensure the comparability
of subjects’ WTPs between lotteries, all lotteries are parametrized such that they
have the same expected value. In the second part of the first experimental session,
we implement an investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995) in order to
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elicit subjects’ valuations of social risk. Subjects make decisions in the role of first
movers, knowing that the decision of the second mover will be made either immedi-
ately afterwards (Early condition) or two weeks later (Late condition).
In order to eliminate confounds such as time-preference effects for monetary out-
comes, we pay out subjects always at the end of the second experimental session. Re-
garding individual risk, we make within-subject comparisons of high–feasibility–low-
desirability and low–feasibility–high–desirability lotteries. We make this compari-
son in the domains of both risk and ambiguity in order to test the CLT implica-
tions in the near future, respectively. We also make within-subject comparisons of
risky high–feasibility–low–desirability lotteries and ambiguous high–feasibility–low-
desirability lotteries, and within-subject comparisons of risky low–feasibility–high-
desirability lotteries and ambiguous low–feasibility–high-desirability lotteries in or-
der to test the CLT implications for individual ambiguity attitudes in the near fu-
ture. Furthermore, we make between-subject comparisons of WTP differences in
high–feasibility–low–desirability and low–feasibility–high–desirability lotteries in or-
der to identify the causal effect of temporal delay on individual risk. Regarding
social risk, we make between-subject comparisons of first-mover decisions in order
to identify the causal effect of temporal delay on social risk.
Main findings : In the case of individual risk, we find that subjects value high–feasi -
bility–low–desirability lotteries always higher than low–feasibility–high–desirability
lotteries. Under ambiguity, this gap decreases when the resolution of the lottery
occurs in the distant future. We find no temporal distance effect for the valuation
of lotteries with known risk. Moreover, we find that subjects are always ambiguity
averse, which becomes less pronounced when low–feasibility–high–desirability lotter-
ies are resolved in the distant future. In the case of social risk, we find that time
distance lowers trusting behavior as trustors correctly anticipate that reciprocity is
lower when trustees decide in the future. In sum, we find some support for temporal
distance effects on decisions under risk, which are consistent with the psychological
predictions of CLT. However, these effects turn out to be relatively small, rendering
no difference in the qualitative interpretation of findings between non-delayed and
delayed contexts of the resolution of risks. Consequently, we conclude that the exter-
nal validity of qualitative results of lab experimental studies on decision under risk
will not be severely affected if temporal resolution in the lab differs from temporal
resolution outside the lab.
19
3 Conclusion
The five essays included in this dissertation have covered different areas of behavioral
economics using the experimental method. They let us draw several lessons, three
of which will be addressed in the following.
First, from data gathered in the experimental laboratory, important implications
may be derived for the behavior of economic agents in reality, even though lab-
experimental data is associated with weak external validity (e.g., Levitt and List,
2007). For example, regulatory reforms that theoretically prove promising were not
able to prevent cooperation of economic agents in a simplified but strict laboratory
environment (section 2.2). This gives policy makers an indication to rethink imple-
menting their intended reforms in practice, where institutional environments are less
strict and the interaction of economic agents is much more natural and rich.
Second, tailored experimental designs enable the identification of partial effects (sec-
tion 2.3) and subtle biases (section 2,4) that would otherwise be difficult to achieve.
In this sense, laboratory data can complement the external validity of secondary
data that is being used for empirical analyses.
Third and lastly, considering psychological frameworks in the analysis of economic
decisions can help to generalize research findings within economics over different
contexts of decision making (section 2.5).
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A.1 Trust, Vulnerability and Trustworthiness
(coauthored with Claudia Keser)
Abstract
In the investment game by Berg et al. (1995), we extend the trustee’s action space
by the opportunity to take money from the trustor, in addition to the amount re-
ceived. Experimental findings indicate that this significantly reduces the trustors’
investment. While the trustees’ average payback relative to the amount received re-
mains unaffected, we observe an important decrease in the relative frequency of zero
returns. Furthermore, we do not observe a single incidence of money being taken
from the trustor. We explain this result by intention-based social preferences.
Keywords: Trust game, Experiment
JEL Classifications: C91, C72, D63
Published:
Economics Letters, Vol. 163, February 2018, pp. 149-151.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.012
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A.2 An Experimental Investigation of
Rating-Market Regulation
(coauthored with Claudia Keser, Emmanuel Peterlé,
and Martin Schmidt)
Abstract
We introduce a simple game-theoretical model that captures the main aspects of
the repeated interaction between an issuer and a credit-rating agency. It involves
up-front payments of issuer-fees and direct publication of requested ratings. Due to
pecuniary injuries for untruthful ratings, the credit-rating agency should always re-
port truthfully in the subgame perfect equilibrium. Knowing this, the issuer should
never request a rating. Conducting laboratory experiments, we find that behav-
ior significantly deviates from the equilibrium prediction in favor of a cooperative
solution: issuers frequently do request ratings, which is often reciprocated with un-
truthful good ratings.
Keywords: Game theory, Laboratory experiments, Rating agencies, Regulation
JEL Classifications: C70, C9, G0
Highlights:
• Repeated CRA-issuer interaction is examined in a simple experimental game.
• CRAs have an incentive to build a reputation for leniency.
• Issuers and CRAs frequently cooperate at the detriment of naïve clients.








A.3 Who is Watching me?
Disentangling Audience and Interpersonal
Closeness Effects in a Pay-What-You-Want
Context
(coauthored with Elisa Hofmann,
Michael E. Fiagbenu, Amir M. Tahamtan,
and Tobias Regner)
Abstract
We disentangle by means of a laboratory experiment two relevant drivers of volun-
tary payments in Pay-What-You-Want settings: the effects of interpersonal closeness
and an audience. Our 2x2 between-subjects design varies the interpersonal closeness
of buyers and the observability of their payments by other buyers. This allows us
to enrich the research on both drivers and identify whether the presence of close
others (closeness effect), payment observability (audience effect), or the combination
of both affects voluntary payments. We find that both effects separately are suffi-
cient to increase voluntary payments. Payments are, on average, higher if they are
observed by an audience and if buyers are acquainted with each other. While the
effect of audience and interpersonal closeness on payments is additive in total, we do
not find an interaction effect, if payments are observed by close others.
Keywords: Social preferences, Experiments, Social image concerns, Pay-What-You-
Want, Interpersonal closeness
JEL Classifications: C91, D03, L11
Highlights:
• We experimentally investigate payment determinants in a Pay-What-You-Want
context.
• Our design varies the interpersonal closeness of buyers (strangers vs. acquain-
tances).
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• We also change whether payments are observed by other buyers or not.
• Payments are higher if they are made public and if buyers are together with
acquainted others.
• The effect is additive as there is no positive interaction effect.
Published:




A.4 Gender Bias in the Evaluation of
Teaching Materials
(coauthored with Holger A. Rau,
Stefan T. Trautmann, and Christian König-Kersting)
Abstract
Gender differences in university teaching evaluations are well established, showing
less favorable assessments of female instructors. It has also been shown that these
differences cannot be linked to differences in students’ course performance, which
would justify differences in evaluations. The less favorable assessments are thus ei-
ther due to differences in aspects that do not affect student performance, but do
affect their class experience (e.g., likability of voice tone), or due to evaluation bi-
ases unrelated to any actual differences in class experience. We find support for the
latter mechanism when any differences between instructors are excluded by having
respondents judge identical teaching materials prepared by either a male or a fe-
male instructor. In two studies, we find that female instructors receive worse ratings
than male instructors from male respondents. In one study, we also find that female
instructors receive higher ratings from female raters. Gender bias vanishes for non-
academic subjects in our data.
Keywords: Gender equality, Discrimination, Teaching evaluations, Higher educa-
tion, Experiment
JEL Classifications: C91, D03, L11
Published:
Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 11, May 2020, Article 1074.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01074
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A.5 Delayed Risks in Individual and
Social Decisions
(coauthored with Holger A. Rau and
Stefan T. Trautmann)
Abstract
This paper experimentally studies temporal-distance effects on decisions under (so-
cial) uncertainty. We elicit subjects’ WTPs for risky and ambiguous lotteries with
the same expected value. The lotteries differ in the combination of (high vs. low)
probabilities with (low vs. high) payoffs. We vary the timing (immediately vs. in
two weeks) when the uncertainty is resolved. Subjects always have lower WTPs
for longshots than for safer lotteries. Under ambiguity, this gap decreases in the
temporal-distance treatment. We find no temporal-distance effect for risky lotteries.
Moreover, we find that subjects are always ambiguity averse, which becomes less
pronounced when low probability lotteries are processed in the future. In a trust
game, we study temporal-distance effects on social risks. Time distance lowers trust-
ing behavior as trustors correctly anticipate that reciprocity is lower when trustees
decide in the future.
Keywords: Time distance, construal level theory, ambiguity, individual risks, social
risks
JEL Classifications: C91, D03, D81
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1. Introduction
Delayed resolution of risks plays a crucial role in economics and management, as
the returns of many investments materialize only with some temporal delay. Exam-
ples involve financial investments, taking out insurance, research and development
strategies, provision of loans, or the execution of a joint project. While the first three
examples refer to decision making contexts that are typically less affected by the ac-
tions of another person (individual risk), the last two examples represent strategic
contexts where the uncertainty involved derives from another person’s willingness to
cooperate (social risk).
Construal Level Theory (CLT; Liberman and Trope, 1998; Trope and Liberman,
2000, 2003, 2010) offers a helpful psychological framework for the understanding of
temporal delay effects in economic decisions. CLT proposes that individuals make
a trade-off between an outcome’s desirability and its feasibility, and weight the out-
come desirability relatively lower than the outcome feasibility in the near future
versus the more distant future.1 For the case of lotteries, it has been shown that
desirability depends on the level of the outcome and feasibility is represented by the
level of the winning probability (Sagristano, Trope, and Liberman, 2002; but see
Trautmann, 2019). CLT thus implies that in the near future individuals have an
increased focus on the winning probability of a lottery, whereas its outcome is less
important. By contrast, in the distant future they focus more on the outcome of a
lottery, whereas its winning probability is less important. Thus, lotteries character-
ized by a low (high) winning probability and a high (low) payoff become more (less)
attractive when they materialize in the future (Sagristano, Trope, and Liberman,
2002).
In the economics literature, delayed resolution has typically been studied for known
risks, i.e., in settings in which individuals know the probability distributions of risky
outcomes. It has been found that in this case, individuals tend to become more risk
tolerant when lotteries materialize with temporal delay (e.g., Noussair and Wu, 2006;
Abdellaoui, Diecidue, and Öncüler, 2011). However, most uncertainties outside the
experimental lab are characterized by unknown (ambiguous) risks, i.e., by situa-
tions in which individuals do not know the probability distributions of the prospects
(Ellsberg, 1961; Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015). From a theoretical point of
view, CLT should also apply to temporal delay effects for ambiguous risk. Moreover,
ambiguity might affect the perceived feasibility of the uncertain outcome. That is,
1The reason is that the desirability and the feasibility of an outcome are mentally represented on
different construal levels. Higher-level construals, such as outcome desirability, are enhanced over
delay, while lower-level construals, such as outcome feasibility, are discounted over delay (Liberman
and Trope, 1998; Sagristano, Trope, and Liberman, 2002; Trope and Liberman, 2003).
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decision-makers may perceive ambiguous lotteries as less feasible than risky lotter-
ies, as the probability distribution is unknown. However, there is little evidence on
temporal delay effects for ambiguous lotteries versus risky lotteries yet.2 Therefore,
the first goal of this paper is to analyze time delay effects in risky versus ambiguous
lotteries.
In many practical settings, uncertain outcomes often also depend on the actions of
other decision makers. A decision maker faces social risk. These situations therefore
represent an important domain to study temporal distance effects, as it is likely that
these outcomes are only revealed after some temporal delay. Consider an investment
in a joint project. This situation is characterized by trust, as an investor faces the
(social) risk that the trustee exploits his trust and does not share the revenue with
him in full. Thus, when decision makers face social risk, not only uncertainty atti-
tudes, but also social preferences may be affected by temporal delay. Little is known
yet about the effects of temporal delay in these situations. Thus, we extend our
analysis to the domain of social risk.3,4
In this paper, we aim to get a comprehensive understanding of the impact of time de-
lay in decisions under individual risk, both known and unknown, and social risk. In
a between-subjects design, we identify the causal effects of time delay by varying the
point in time (immediately vs. two weeks later) when the outcomes of the lotteries
are materialized. Our design allows a direct test of the widely-cited CLT predictions.
In our main treatment (Late), subjects state their willingness to pay (WTP) for lot-
teries, which are resolved two weeks later in the distant future. By contrast, subjects
in the control treatment (Early) state their WTPs for the same lotteries, which are
resolved immediately. Following CLT, we test whether low-probability high-payoff
lotteries (low feasibility and high desirability) are perceived as more favorable when
they are resolved in the distant future, and vice versa for high- probability low-payoff
2Onay, La-Orunal and Öncüler (2013) and Liu and Öncüler (2017) are exceptions. The papers
find that temporally delaying the resolution of lotteries may attenuate ambiguity aversion. However,
a problem in the experimental design of these papers for our research question is that they not only
varied the timing of the resolution of the lotteries, but also the timing of subjects’ payments. As a
consequence, it is possible that the change in subjects’ behavior may also be affected by subjects’
time preferences, not uncertainty attitude.
3Ederer and Schneider (2020) find in a binary trust game with background risk (i.e., the amount
sent back by the trustee is lost with a non-zero probability) that temporally delaying the decision
of the trustee did not affect the frequency of trust. We aim to observe changes in the degree of
trust in a deterministic setting; we also use a more fine-grained, non-binary setting.
4We do not consider the social aspect entering ambiguous decisions in the form of group decision
making (Charness et al., 2013; Keck et al., 2014). Although the interaction of social and temporal
effect is of much interest for practical applications, the methodological complications of group
decision making imply that these effects may better studied independently, in a design tailored to
group decision research.
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lotteries. We also test the predictions of CLT for ambiguous lotteries, studying be-
havior for ambiguous events, as well as studying ambiguity attitudes in the delayed-
resolution context. The idea is that ambiguous lotteries may be perceived as less
feasible, since the probability distribution is not known. We test whether ambiguous
lotteries become relatively more attractive compared to risky lotteries in the distant
future, as feasibility is less of a concern.
We complement the analysis of individual delayed risks with a situation where
trustors in a trust game are confronted with social risk. In the Late treatment,
trustees are informed about the amount invested by trustors, but they do not take
their decisions until two weeks have passed. In the Early treatment trustees are
informed and decide immediately. Importantly, in all conditions and for all tasks,
actual payments will always occur in the second meeting.
Our data support the CLT prediction that low-probability event lotteries become
more attractive than high-probability event lotteries for future resolution for ambi-
guity, and for some specifications for known risks. Focusing on ambiguity attitudes,
we find little effect overall. Finally, our analysis of social risk shows that delayed
decisions lead to lower trustworthiness, which is correctly anticipated by trustors
qualitatively, but not quantitatively: the effect is larger than expected by trustors.
Beliefs strongly map into trusting behavior, but the small belief effect triggered by
Late resolution induces only a small and insignificant effect on trust.
In sum, our results suggest that some temporal delay effects on individual and social
uncertainty can be observed, but that these effects are potentially small. That is,
delayed resolution does not qualitatively challenge typical immediate-resolution re-
sults, despite some significant changes in behavior. Note that virtually all experimen-
tal measurements of individual or social risk are conducted in immediate-resolution
designs (“early”), where risk is resolved and subjects are paid directly after the ex-
periment. In contrast, many situations outside the lab involve delayed resolution
and payment. Some studies building on CLT have suggested that temporal delay
effects might be substantial, which would harm the external validity of immediate
resolution-designs for outside-the-lab decision making. Our data, while supporting
the presence of temporal effects, do not suggest that substantial threats to external
validity derive from differences in the resolution of uncertainty.
2. Experimental Design
We test the effects of temporal distance on risk-taking behavior for individual risks
and social risks. In a lottery task, we elicit subjects’ valuations of individual risks by
asking subjects to state their willingness to pay (WTP) for lotteries with known and
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unknown risks. The lotteries are characterized by the same expected value, but they
differ in the winning probability (high vs. low). In a trust game (Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe, 1995), we measure subjects’ attitudes towards social risks by studying
their trust (or investment) levels in the strategic game.
We manipulate temporal distance with two between-subject time conditions (Early
treatment and Late treatment) to which subjects are randomly assigned. Both con-
ditions consist of two experimental meetings each. In Early, all uncertain outcomes
of individual and social risks are resolved at the end of the first experimental meet-
ing. By contrast, in Late, uncertain outcomes are resolved at the beginning of the
second experimental meeting two weeks later. All decision-dependent payments are
obtained in the second, later meeting. In what follows, we explain the lottery tasks
and the trust game in both time conditions in detail.
2.1 Lottery task
We measure subjects’ WTPs for four different lotteries, which are presented in two
subsequent subsets of two lotteries each. In each set, subjects are confronted with
a risky lottery and an ambiguous lottery, both of which have the same (underlying)
objective winning probability and the same monetary payoff. In the first set, subjects
have to state their WTPs for playing a risky lottery and an ambiguous lottery with
a low payoff of €10 and a high objective winning probability of 0.8. In the second
set, subjects have to state their WTPs for playing a risky lottery and an ambiguous
lottery with a high payoff of €40 and a low objective winning probability of 0.2. All
four lotteries have the same expected value of €8. In the experiment, we vary the
order of the two lottery sets for half of the subjects to control for order effects. The
monetary payoff of a lottery is determined by a random draw from one of two boxes,
each of which is filled with 100 colored chips. For the risky lotteries the random
draw is conducted out of the risky box, i.e., a box where the composition of colored
chips is known. The risky box contains colored chips of ten different colors, each of
which exists exactly ten times. By contrast, for the ambiguous lotteries the random
draw is conducted out of the ambiguous box, i.e., a box where the composition of
colored chips is unknown. The ambiguous box may contain chips of the same ten
colors, but the exact quantity of each color is unknown. Table 1 gives an overview
of the four lotteries and the two lottery sets presented to subjects in order 1.
Lotteries were determined as follows. In all sessions, before the decision tasks were
explained or started, subjects were first asked to select a set of colors for later use
(the “winning” colors for the later random draws). On the computer screen, we pre-
sented subjects subsequently with two sets of ten colors. Each set consisted of the
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Table 1: Risky and ambiguous lotteries conditional on the representation set.
lottery set 1
box lottery type obj. winning prob. payoff lottery characteristics
known composition risky 0.8 €10 high prob. & low payoff
unknown composition ambiguous 0.8 €10 high prob. & low payoff
lottery set 2
box lottery type obj. winning prob. payoff lottery characteristics
known composition risky 0.2 €40 low prob. & high payoff
unknown composition ambiguous 0.2 €40 low prob. & high payoff
same ten colors (black, red, blue, green, yellow, brown, purple, grey, cyan, white).
In the first set we asked subjects to select eight of the ten colors. In the second set
they had to select two out of the ten colors. We used subjects’ selections in the two
sets as a criterion to determine whether a lottery would pay out in the high winning
probability (0.8) and low winning probability (0.2) cases, respectively. For instance,
if a subject has selected red and black in set two, this means that a lottery of this set
would win, if either a red or a black poker chip was drawn. Importantly, at the time
of selecting the colors, subjects were not told the purpose of the selection process,
nor did they receive any instructions for the experiment yet.
After selecting the two subsets of colors, subjects were presented with the two boxes.
For this purpose, we asked them to come to the reception room of the lab. In this
room, the two boxes were placed on the table.5 We explained that each box contained
exactly 100 colored chips. We also told them that box 1 (known composition) exactly
contained ten different colors, which each contained exactly ten times, and that box
2 (unknown composition) exactly contained 100 colored chips, but the composition
of the ten colors was unknown. We informed the subjects that the chips could be of
any of the ten colors as in box 1, in an unknown composition. Afterwards, subjects
returned to their cubicles in the lab. We handed out paper instructions, explaining
the decision-making process for evaluating the four lotteries.
2.1.1 Elicitation of WTPs
We applied a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism to elicit subjects’ WTPs
for the lotteries in an incentive-compatible way. In each set, subjects had to state
their WTP for the risky lottery and for the ambiguous lottery. Subjects were en-
dowed with €10 to pay for the lotteries, and they could choose any amount between
€0 and €10 in increments of €0.01, respectively. After subjects completed set one,
they were presented with set two.
5The boxes were not yet placed at the table when subjects arrived at the laboratory.
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Once subjects had specified their WTPs for all lotteries, a computerized random
draw determined which of the four lotteries was relevant for a subject. Then, the
computer determined a random price between €0 and €10 in increments of €0.01 for
the relevant lottery. If a subject’s WTP was at least as high as the random price, the
subject bought the relevant lottery and paid the price determined by the computer.
In this case, the random price was subtracted from the initial endowment of €10,
with the remainder kept by the subject. If a subject’s WTP was below the random
price, the subject did not buy the relevant lottery and kept her initial endowment of
€10.
In a next step, subjects were informed on the computer screen whether they bought
a lottery and if so, which box would be relevant for the random draw. Subjects knew
that in the case they have bought a lottery, they would have to draw a chip out of
the relevant box to determine whether the lottery they bought would pay out. The
random draw was either processed with box 1 or box 2, depending on whether a
risky or an ambiguous lottery was chosen by the computerized random draw. If the
drawn color matched one of the colors that was initially selected by the subject in
the relevant set, the lottery paid out. Otherwise, the lottery did not pay, and the
subject received a payoff of €0 from the lottery.
2.1.2 Processing of the lottery outcomes in the Early vs. Late treatment
The procedure described above was identical in the Early and Late treatment. In
both conditions, subjects were informed in the first experimental meeting on whether
or not they bought a lottery. The crucial (and only) difference between Early and
Late was the timing of the random draw of a chip from the selected box. In Early,
subjects had to draw a chip out of the relevant box at the very end of the first
experimental meeting. In Late, subjects had to draw a chip out of the relevant box
at the end of the second experimental meeting two weeks later. In both conditions,
payments were made in the second meeting.
2.1.3 Guessing of the stated WTPs during the second meeting
We also controlled for whether subjects in the second experimental meeting (which
took place two weeks after the first meeting) still remembered their stated WTPs
for the four lotteries (potentially indicating a clear preference). Subjects in the
second experimental meeting were again presented with the same four lotteries of
the first experimental meeting. They could earn €0.50 for each correct guess of their
own WTPs indicated during the first meeting. Second meetings in both treatments




In the next stage, we measured the effects of temporal distance on subjects’ atti-
tudes towards social risk in a trust game. The trust game was conducted in the first
experimental meeting before subjects were informed on whether or not they bought
a lottery. At this point, we handed out new instructions, explaining the trust-game
stage to the subjects. In the game, we apply the strategy method to elicit first-
mover (trustor) decisions, i.e., all subjects decided in the role of a trustor. For this
purpose, they were told that they have an endowment of €6, which could be sent in
increments of €0.50 to the second mover (i.e., the trustee). Subjects were informed
that any positive investment is tripled and sent to the trustee. Subjects knew that
after deciding as a trustor, half of them are randomly assigned the role of a trustee.
It was made clear that each trustee is paired to an anonymous other subject which
was assigned the role of a trustor. The trustees also received an endowment of €6.
Trustees could return any amount (in increments of €0.50) of the tripled amount
that they received from the trustor. Trustees could not send their endowment to the
trustor.
We also elicited trustors’ beliefs about trustees’ returns for each of six possible full
integer investments (€1, €2,...,€6). Subjects gave their unincentivized belief by
indicating the expected return- amount by open entry in the interval between €0
and 3 times the transferred investment. The inputs could be made in increments
of €0.50. We collected these data right after trustors made their decisions. At this
time, they did not know their role in the game yet.
2.2.2 Resolution of the trustee’ decisions: Early vs. Late treatment
The treatments differ in the timing when trustees make their decisions and when
trustors are informed on the outcome of the social risk. Importantly, in both treat-
ments, trustees observed the decision of the trustor in the first experimental session.
However, only in Early, trustees made their decisions in the first meeting. By con-
trast, in Late, trustees made their decisions two weeks later in the second meeting.
In the Late treatment, trustees decided right after the WTP-guessing task. Once the
trust game was finished, the experiment continued with the resolution of the random
draws of the lottery-valuation task.
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2.3 Experimental procedures
2.3.1 Timing of the experimental stages
In both treatments, each session consisted of two experimental meetings with the
same subjects. That is, each session was split up to two experimental meetings on
different days. The second meeting took place two weeks later on the same day
of the week and at the same starting time as the first meeting. We recruited sub-
jects with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the experiment was programmed with z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). We informed subjects that in order to participate in the exper-
iment, they would have to sign in for both meetings on both days. They were also
informed that they would only receive the compensation of the experiment, if they
participated in both meetings.6 In this case, they will receive the total payments for
the decisions made in both meetings after the end of the second meeting. In the Late
treatment, it is by design not possible to pay subjects in the first meeting, since we do
not resolve the lottery outcomes until two weeks later. To rule out any wealth effects
or time-discounting effects, we also delayed the payment of subjects’ final earnings
in the Early treatment. The only payment subjects received for participating in the
first meeting was a show-up fee of €5. The show up was paid to them after the end
of the first meeting in both treatments.
Then subjects took part in the lottery task and completed the trust game. In the
Early treatment, we resolved the lotteries at the end of the first meeting. Subjects
were informed on the computer screen on the relevant lottery and whether they pur-
chased it. Then, we came to each cubicle and checked the computer screen whether
they had bought a lottery, and if so, brought the relevant box to their desk. Next,
subjects could draw a colored chip out of the relevant box. They won the lottery if
the chip was of one of their selected colors. We checked this on the computer screen
and typed in the outcome of the lottery in subjects’ computer terminal.7 Next,
subjects were handed out envelopes, which contained a sheet of paper. They were
told that the computer will allocate a unique id to them, which will be shown on
the computer screen. The purpose of this was to store the data on subjects’ choices
and earnings from the first meeting such that this information could be used in the
second meeting to finish the experiment and pay subjects. They were told that they
should write down their id and they had to put this sheet of paper in the envelope.
Finally, subjects completed a short computerized post-experimental questionnaire,
6At the beginning of the first experimental meeting, subjects had to sign a form to give their
consent to the rule that they will not get their final payments, if they do not show up at the second
meeting.
7The input was protected by a code which was only known to the experimenter.
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where we asked them for their gender, their age, their field of study, and the level
of study (bachelor vs. master). After the first meeting was finished subjects were
given the €5 show-up fee when they brought the envelope to the experimenter. We
kept the envelopes with their names on it until the second meeting took place, when
they would open it for the code.
In the Late treatment, we did not resolve the lotteries at the end of the first
meeting. Here, subjects were only informed about the selected lottery, the drawn
random price, and whether they bought the lottery. At the beginning of the second
meeting, subjects received the envelope containing their id. They were told that
they will receive another €5 for participation in this meeting (this was the same in
both treatments). Subjects typed in their id on the computer terminal, and after
identification by the computer, we started to elicit subjects’ guesses of their WTPs
of the first meeting (see Section 2.1.3), followed by the resolution of the risk tasks.
The computer reminded them of their role in the trust game, which started two
weeks ago. Furthermore, the trustees were informed about the amount that was
sent to them by their matched trustor, and they made their decisions. Next, the
lotteries were resolved. Afterwards, subjects completed a questionnaire, which was
used for an unrelated study (Özgümüs et al., 2020). Then, subjects were informed
on the computer screen on their total payments from the first and second experi-
mental meetings. Finally, they were paid out. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of all
experimental stages in both experimental meetings of Early and Late. In the figure,
we emphasize any treatment differences in bold font.




The experiment had seven sessions of each treatment. All sessions consisted of two
experimental meetings. In total 264 subjects participated, i.e., 132 subjects (63
male, 69 female) in Early and 132 subjects (61 male, 71 female) in Late. The at-
trition rate was low, with 249 of the 264 subjects again showing up for the second
meeting. Note that all relevant data except trustworthiness were already collected
during the first meeting. The first meetings took on average 70 minutes in Early
and 60 minutes in Late. The second meetings took on average 30 minutes in Early
and 45 minutes in Late. On average, subjects earned €30.38 in Early and €28.82




In this section, we derive our hypotheses for individual risk taking. We build our
hypotheses on Construal-Level Theory (CLT, Liberman and Trope, 1998; Trope and
Liberman, 2000; 2003; 2010), the leading psychological theory to explain behavior
depending on the temporal framing. Applying CLT and following Sagristano, Trope,
and Liberman (2002), we predict that temporally distancing the resolution of lot-
teries increases the preference for low-probability lotteries with high payoffs relative
to high-probability lotteries with low payoffs. The reason is that people put a lower
weight on the feasibility of the lotteries (which is represented by the level of the
winning probability) and a higher weight on the desirability of the lotteries (which
is represented by the level of the possible payoff), for more distant resolution. In
our setting, this should translate to a smaller within-subject difference WTP (high-
probability lottery)–WTP (low-probability lottery) when lotteries are resolved in the
future.
H1a: The difference between WTPs of the risky lotteries with high and low probabil-
ities should be smaller, if the lotteries are processed in the Late treatment compared
to Early treatment.
Translating this reasoning to the domain of ambiguity, we predict that temporally
spacing the resolution of ambiguous outcomes should lead to a similar effect. That
is, the lower-level construal feasibility should be discounted, whereas the higher-
level construal desirability should be enhanced in the future. Translated to our
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ambiguous lotteries, we expect that in the distant future, subjects should show an
increased preference for the ambiguous lottery with a low winning likelihood and
a high payoff, as they are attracted by the desirability of the high payoff. This
should thus again lead to a smaller within-subject difference WTP (high-likelihood
lottery)–WTP (low-likelihood lottery) when lotteries are resolved in the future.
H1b: The difference between WTPs of the ambiguous lotteries with high and low
winning likelihood should be larger, if the lotteries are processed in the Late treat-
ment compared to Early treatment.
Regarding ambiguity attitudes, we assume that the unknown probability distribution
of ambiguous lotteries leads to a lower perceived feasibility as compared to risky lot-
teries. Individuals are typically ambiguity averse for high-probability lotteries with
low payoff and ambiguity seeking for low-probability lotteries with high payoffs (see
Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015). This would be our prediction in Early, which
is the typical design feature in most experimental studies (because payments are
obtained immediately). If individuals’ valuations of risky and ambiguous lotteries
are affected by temporal distance (see H1a, H1b), this may have consequences for
individuals’ ambiguity attitudes, too. First, if there are different effects for risk and
ambiguity regarding low- versus high-likelihood lotteries, this affects the ambiguity
attitude as defined by the difference in valuations for risky and ambiguous lotteries
with the same underlying probability. Second, the lower feasibility of ambiguous
lotteries may become less relevant for distant resolution. We thus predict that for
high likelihood lotteries, ambiguity aversion should be attenuated when lotteries are
resolved in the distant future. Conversely, given our expectation that individuals
are ambiguity seeking for low-probability lotteries with high payoffs, the lower focus
on the probability dimension in Late should lead to a weaker relative preference for
ambiguous lotteries in the low-probability case.
H2a: For high likelihood lotteries, the difference in WTPs of the risky and ambigu-
ous lotteries should be smaller, if the lotteries are processed in the Late treatment
compared to Early treatment (less ambiguity aversion).
H2b: For low likelihood lotteries, the difference in WTPs of the risky and ambigu-
ous lotteries should be larger (less negative), if the lotteries are processed in the Late
treatment compared to the Early treatment (less ambiguity seeking).
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3.2 Social risk
For social risk we do not derive hypotheses, as there are two opposing theories
how fist movers may react to time distance. On the one hand, trustors decide un-
der uncertainty and face ambiguity regarding second movers’ likelihood of behaving
trustworthy. Assuming that first movers face an ambiguous gamble when investing,
CLT would predict that trustors trust more in Late compared to Early, due to the
lower focus on the probability dimension. On the other hand, there is evidence that
time distance may induce a more selfish behavior of trustees. Neo et al. (2013) ar-
gue that reciprocity may be attenuated in the future, as affective states are subject
to adaption (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999). This effect may be pronounced, as
trustees may behave less reciprocal in the distant future due to an increased feeling
of loss aversion. The idea is that trustees perceive a loss when returning money to
the trustor, as they believe the received money is their property. Research suggests
that this valuation may be amplified over time (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein, 1998).
Finally, Neo et al. (2013) argue that time delays should lead to more System-2
processing, which is responsible for less intuitive, but more controlled and slow de-
cisions. Therefore, after time delays, subjects should behave more rational, as hey
have more time for System 2 processing.8 Thus, social preferences are attenuated,
and the trustees behave more selfishly. As a consequence, trustors should lower their
investments in Late compared to Early, when they anticipate the attenuated reci-
procity of trustees in the distant future. In sum, it is not clear which of the two
effects will dominate. Therefore, we do not formulate a hypothesis for social risk. In
the results section we test, which of the two effects dominates.
4. Results
4.1 Individual risk
Table 2 presents an overview of the mean WTPs (in Euro) for the risky and am-
biguous lotteries, and for high and low likelihood events. The table also reports
the difference in the WTPs between the high probability and the low probability
lotteries, as well as between the risky and ambiguous lotteries for a given probability
dimension (0.8 vs. 0.2). Results are shown by treatments. The data encompass n =
264 observations (n = 132 in each of the two treatments). We first present raw com-
parisons using non- parametric tests, which test for differences in subject’s WTPs
within the treatments. We then turn to regression analyses to test for treatment
8This might explain similar findings observed in other situations of social risk such as the dictator
game or ultimatum game (Kovartik, 2009; Grimm and Mengel, 2011).
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effects in the difference in WTP-difference between Early and Late.
Table 2: Subjects’ WTPs (in Euro) for the risky and ambiguous lotteries in Early
and Late.
Early Treatment Late Treatment
Prob. 0.8 Prob. 0.2 Difference Prob. 0.8 Prob. 0.2 Difference
Risky Lottery 6.32 (2.63) 5.06 (2.65) 1.26 (3.12) 5.49 (2.72) 4.80 (3.05) 1.14 (3.69)
Ambig. Lottery 4.79 (2.87) 3.68 (2.58) 1.11 (2.63) 4.58 (2.98) 3.84 (3.00) 0.74 (3.74)
Difference 1.52 (2.46) 1.38 (2.40) 1.36 (2.50) 0.96 (2.33)
Notes : Bold print indicates significant differences at the 1% level, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
For the risky lotteries, subjects express a higher WTP in the high probability tasks
as compared to the low probability tasks (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p < 0.001, in
both treatments), and no evidence for risk-seeking (which would imply WTP>€8)
for low probability lotteries. The difference in the WTPs between the high vs. low
probability lotteries is moderately lower in the Late condition (1.14) as compared to
the Early condition (1.26). For the ambiguous lotteries, we also find that in both
treatments the WTP is significantly higher in high probability tasks than in the
low probability tasks (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p < 0.001, in both treatments).
The difference in the WTPs between the high and low probability lotteries is lower
in Late (0.74) as compared to Early (1.11). Subjects are ambiguity averse in both
tasks of both treatments, i.e., the WTPs of risky lotteries are significantly higher
than the WTPs of ambiguous lotteries for both high and low probability (Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests, p < 0.001). Thus, for low-probability lotteries, our data show no
evidence for ambiguity-seeking (which would imply WTP-ambiguous > WTP-risky).
The WTP difference between risky and ambiguous lotteries is slightly lower in Late
(1.36 and 0.96) than in Early (1.52 and 1.38). A remarkable feature of our data is the
absence of risk and ambiguity seeking behavior for low likelihood events, in contrast
to the fourfold patterns often reported in the literature (e.g., Trautmann and van
den Kuilen, 2015; Kocher et al., 2018; Li et al., 2020). The strongly and univer-
sally risk and ambiguity averse behavior might be explained by the WTP approach.
WTP emphasizes reference points and framing of buying price as loss (Trautmann
et al., 2011); this might have led subjects to bid lower values for the low-probability
lotteries compared to choice-list or WTA-based studies (which measure certainty
equivalents). Since we focus on differences between conditions, the absolute price
level should not be crucial for our research question.
We test for treatment effects in the WTP differences (H1a and H1b) with random
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effects OLS regressions on the WTP differences in subjects’ valuation of high vs.
low probability lotteries. Since all subjects decide on the WTPs of low and high
probability lotteries in the risky and in the ambiguous domain, we can compute two
WTP differences for each subject. We consider this panel structure in our regression
analyses. In model (1) we include the treatment dummy of intertest (Late Condi-
tion), a dummy for risky lotteries (Risky Lottery), and the interaction term Late
Condition x Risky Lottery that measures the differential effect of Late in the risky-
lottery conditions. Finally, we add a dummy (no-show), which is positive for the
15 subjects, who did not show up for the second experimental session. In models
(2) and (3) we include control variables for gender, age, whether subjects are eco-
nomics students and for the presentation order (1 or 2) of the lotteries. We also add
a variable that controls for the size of the experimental session.9 Finally, in model
(3) we include the differences between subjects’ guessed WTPs (stated in the second
experimental session) and their real WTPs (stated in the first experimental session),
as a measure of the robustness of their bids (assuming noisy WTP are remembered
less precisely). The regressions are clustered at session level.
Table 3: Random effects OLS regressions on the valuation of high prob. vs. low
prob. lotteries.
WTP Difference (high prob. - low prob.)
(1) (2) (3)
Late Condition -0.38 (0.22)∗ -0.40 (0.20)∗∗ -0.57 (0.21)∗∗∗
Risky Lottery 0.15 (0.12) 0.15 (0.12) 0.19 (0.12)∗
Late Condition x Risky Lottery 0.25 (0.21) 0.25 (0.21) 0.13 (0.23)
No-Show 0.49 (1.04) 0.34 (1.05)
Guess WTP risk high 0.01 (0.02)
Guess WTP ambig high 0.02 (0.03)
Guess WTP risk low 0.02 (0.03)
Guess WTP ambig low -0.03 (0.04)
Controls No Yes Yes
N WTPs (subjects) 528 (264) 528 (264) 498 (249)
Notes : Report random effects panel regression results, robust standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on 14 sessions. Controls are order of
the presentation of the lotteries, session size, female, age and a dummy,
controlling for economics students. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively. Sample sizes vary across columns due to some
missing values.
9As the size of our sessions varied between 10 and 24 subjects, we control for potential session
effects, caused by the number of subjects participating in a session.
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Model (1) shows a marginally significant difference betweenWTP-differences in Early
and Late. In models (2) and (3), the effect is larger and significant. The observed
effect is in line with the predictions of CLT. That is, the WTP difference between
high and low probability lotteries becomes significantly smaller when lotteries are
processed two weeks later. F-tests show that Late Condition and Late Condition x
Risky Lottery are jointly significantly different from zero in model (3) (p = 0.030),
but not in model (1) (p = 0.214) and in model (2) (p = 0.121). That is, the effect
is mostly present for ambiguous lotteries, and less clear for risky lotteries. This is
consistent with the raw averages shown in Table 2. That is, we find clear support
for H2a, less so for H1a.
Next, we test for time-distance effects on subjects’ ambiguity attitudes (H2a, H2b).
Table 4 presents random effects OLS regressions on the WTP differences between
risky and ambiguous lotteries. The WTP difference can be interpreted as a sub-
ject’s ambiguity attitude, i.e., subjects with a positive (negative) difference can be
interpreted as ambiguity averse (ambiguity seeking), whereas subjects with no WTP
difference show ambiguity neutrality. We present similar regression models as in
Table 3. The only difference is that we now incorporate an indicator variable (Low
prob. Lottery), which is positive (zero) for low (high) probability lotteries, instead of
the Risky Lottery indicator. Moreover, we add the interaction between this variable
and the treatment dummy (Late Condition x Low prob.).
The treatment dummy is not significant in any of the models. Thus, we find no
treatment effects for ambiguity attitudes when lotteries are processed in the future.
This holds for both low and high probability lotteries. Thus, we reject hypotheses
2a and 2b. The moderately significant negative coefficient of Low prob. Lottery
suggests in model (3) that ambiguity aversion is generally less pronounced for low
probability lotteries, which is in line with the literature (e.g., Trautmann and van
den Kuilen, 2015; Kocher et al., 2018).
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Table 4: Random effects OLS regressions on the ambiguity attitude for high prob.
and low prob. lotteries
WTP Difference (risky - ambig. lotteries)
(1) (2) (3)
Late Condition -0.19 (0.34) -0.19 (0.33) -0.22 (0.28)
Low prob. lottery -0.15 (0.12) -0.15 (0.12) 0.20 (0.12)∗
Late Condition x Low prob. -0.25 (0.21) -0.25 (0.21) -0.13 (0.23)
No-Show 0.44 (0.73) 0.74 (0.71)
Guess WTP risk high 0.02 (0.02)
Guess WTP ambig high -0.01 (0.01)
Guess WTP risk low 0.02 (0.01)
Guess WTP ambig low -0.04 (0.02)
Controls No Yes Yes
N WTPs (subjects) 528 (264) 528 (264) 498 (249)
Notes : Report random effects panel regression results, robust standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on 14 sessions. Controls are order of
the presentation of the lotteries, session size, female, age and a dummy,
controlling for economics students. ∗ indicates significance at the 10% level.
Sample sizes vary across columns due to some missing values
4.2 Social risk
We next turn to the analysis of time-distance effects under social risks. Table 5
presents the data of the trust game. The table summarizes the means of the invest-
ment levels of trustors (first movers), of first movers’ mean beliefs on the returned
amounts, the returned amounts by the trustees (second movers), and the levels of
trustees’ trustworthiness (return rate). We measured first movers’ beliefs on the
return rate of the second movers, conditional on different investment levels (€1-
€6). Based on this, we calculate the mean beliefs on the returned amount for each
treatment. The level of trustees’ trustworthiness is the return rate, i.e., the amount
which was returned to the first movers divided by their investment. The data are
conditioned on the Early and the Late condition. We have a higher number of ob-
servations for first movers, because every player decided in the role of a first mover,
but only half of the subjects acted as second movers. For second movers we do not
exactly have half the data, as we had to drop subjects who did not show up for the
second experimental session.
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Table 5: Investment and returns in the trust game
Early Condition N Late Condition N
Investment Level of FMs 4.26 (2.01) 132 4.04 (2.13)ns 132
Mean Belief on Returned Amount of FMs 4.78 (1.57) 132 4.31 (1.75)∗∗ 132
Returned Amount of SMs 5.89 (4.24) 66 4.44 (4.22)∗∗ 56
Received Return Rate of FMs 126.83% 66 92.29% 56
Notes : Comparison between Early and Late treatment: ns = not significant; ∗∗ significant at
5% level, Mann-Whitney tests.
The data show that investment levels are approximately five percent lower in the
Late condition (4.04) than in the Early condition (4.26). The difference is not
significant though, for a non-parametric test (two-sided Mann-Whitney test, p =
0.334). It can be seen that the mean belief on returned amount is significantly lower
in Late (4.31) than in Early (4.78) (two-sided Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.041). We
also find that trustees send back less, when the decision to return is delayed: they
return an average amount that is significantly lower by 25 percent in Late (4.44)
than in Early (5.89) (two-sided Mann- Whitney test, p = 0.049). First movers in the
Late treatment receive a significantly lower return rate (92.29%) than in the Early
treatment (126.83%) (two-sided Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.022).
Table 6 presents Tobit regressions to test for treatment differences in trust levels.
The models focus on the investment levels of first movers. All models incorporate
our treatment dummy. The second model adds controls, i.e., session size, a variable
that controls for the size of our experimental sessions, a female dummy, subjects’
age and a variable, which controls for economics students. The third model adds
Mean Belief (see Table 5). All models are left censored at 0 and right censored at
6. The regressions are clustered at the session level.
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Table 6: Tobit regressions on Trustors’ investment levels
Invetsment Level of FMs
(1) (2) (3)
Late Condition -0.61 (0.45) -0.60 (0.48) -0.19 (0.51)
Mean Belief 0.78 (0.15)∗∗∗
No-show 2.67 (1.17)∗∗ 2.48 (1.17)∗∗ 1.86 (1.06)∗
Controls No Yes Yes
N 264 264 264
Notes : Columns (1)–(2) report Tobit regression results, robust standard errors
in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on 14 sessions. Controls are session
size, female, age and a dummy, controlling for econ students. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
The regression models (1) and (2) confirm the findings of the non-parametric tests,
i.e., in the Late condition, we find an insignificantly lower investment level as com-
pared to Early. Model (3) shows that the coefficient of Mean Belief is positive and
significant, indicating that first movers’ beliefs about the other player’s reaction have
a strong influence on their investment levels. This effect replicates previous findings
(Fehr et al., 2020). As shown in Table 5, first movers’ beliefs about the amount
returned are lower the in Late (4.31) than in Early (4.78). Thus, they seem to an-
ticipate that reciprocity is attenuated in the distant future (Neo et al., 2013). The
small and insignificant drop in trust for Late is consistent with a small effect on
beliefs transmitted by an effect of 0.78 to investment levels.
Table 7: Tobit regressions on Trustees’ returned amount and returned rate of per-
centage
Returned Amount of SMs Received Return Rate of FMs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Late Condition -1.91 (0.87)∗∗ -1.80 (0.80)∗∗ -0.41 (0.15)∗∗∗ -0.40 (0.12)∗∗∗
Trust Level 0.58 (0.25)∗∗ 0.85 (0.25)∗∗ 0.16 (0.05)∗∗∗ 0.16 (0.05)∗∗∗
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 122 122 122 122
Notes : Columns (1)–(4) report Tobit regression results, robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered on 14 sessions. Controls are sessionsize, female, age and a
dummy, controlling for econ students. ∗∗,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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Turning to second movers, Table 7 presents Tobit regressions on trustees’ returned
amount (models (1) and (2)). These regressions are left censored at 0 and right
censored at 18. The table also presents Tobit regressions on the received return
rate of FMs (models (3) and (4)), which represents second mover’s trustworthiness.
These regressions are left censored at 0 and right censored at 3. All models in Table
7 include the same covariates as in the regressions of Table 6. Moreover, we con-
trol for the level or trust, because larger investments may elicit higher return rates.
Focusing on the returned amounts, it can be seen in model (1) and (2) that the
treatment dummy has a significantly negative coefficient. Thus, time distance low-
ers the amount returned by trustees. Models (3) and (4) confirm that time distance
attenuates reciprocal behavior: conditional on the amount invested, trustees return
lower amounts. It is noteworthy that the actual reduction due to delay is larger
than the one expected by FMs (Table 5); however, this is caused by FM being too
optimistic in the Early condition.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the effects of the delayed resolution of individual and
social uncertainty. Our study is framed in the context of Construal Level Theory
(CLT; Liberman and Trope, 1998; Trope and Liberman, 2000, 2003, 2010). We em-
ployed an incentivized lab experiment with a sizable sample (n = 264), in which we
varied the timing of the resolution of uncertainty (immediately vs. in two weeks).
We eliminated time-preference effects by paying all uncertain earnings in the sec-
ond meeting in both conditions. Extending previous work by Sagristano, Trope,
and Liberman (2002) on known risk to ambiguous risks and social risks, we find
some evidence for CLT predictions and delay effect. This in itself is remarkable
given previous non-replication results for CLT (Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2012;
Trautmann, 2019). However, consistent with papers that question whether reported
CLT effect sizes in the psychological literature represent robust phenomena, we find
small and sometimes insignificant effects that do not change any qualitative findings
(risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, trust and the role of beliefs). One of the strongest
effects obtains for a decision under certainty, the decision of the trust game second
movers. The finding that trustees become more egoistic is in line with the results
of Grimm and Mengel (2011). The authors report that delaying the decisions of
recipients attenuates social preferences and increases the acceptance of low offers in
an ultimatum game.
Our theoretical framework differs from those often applied in economics in two es-
sential features. First, valuation of uncertainty resolution is time-dependent, but not
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dynamic (e.g., Kreps and Porteus, 1978, 1979; Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997). Second,
our framework does not shift both the resolution of uncertainty and WTP-payments
into the future, and so does not ask individuals to state present estimates of fu-
ture lottery valuations in order to eliminate time preference effects (e.g., Abdellaoui,
Diecidue, and Öncüler, 2011; Pan, Web, and Zank, 2019). Such an approach may
lead to potential biases in the desirability of future outcomes, e.g., if individuals
anticipate that buying prices are deducted from the initial endowment in the future.
We hold constant the date of payments for both WTP and resulting payoffs in the
two delay conditions. This enables us to rigorously test time- dependent reversals in
both individual and social preferences over the resolution of uncertainty.
In conclusion, we find some support for time distance effects on decisions under un-
certainty, which are consistent with the psychological predictions of construal level
theory. With the “standard” or “typical” design in experimental decision-making
studies employing immediate resolution of risk, and many situations outside the
lab involving delayed resolution, external validity may be systematically threatened.
However, the effects are small and do not change any qualitative interpretations in
our study. In line with previous studies testing the robustness of CLT, we therefore
conclude that psychological temporal distance effects are subtle psychological effects
that may only have secondary relevance in most practical settings. The external va-
lidity of qualitative results of lab experimental studies on decision under uncertainty
will not be severely affected if temporal resolution in the lab differs from temporal
resolution outside the lab.
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